According to economic theory, elderly homeowners should be much more eager than they actually are to adopt financial instruments allowing them to borrow against home equity. This paper investigates the determinants of interest for the Italian elderly in one such instrument, the reverse mortgage. We draw from a unique dataset, UniCredit's 2007 survey on household savings, and use a discrete choice model (ordered probit) to perform our empirical analysis. Out of 1,200 respondents, roughly 60% claimed to have no interest in the product, while the remaining 40% expressed various degrees of appeal, from quite low to very high. Three main findings emerge from our analysis: first, homeowners who are prepared to sell their home are more likely to be interested in the product. Second, respondents perceive reverse mortgages as personal debt, even though the burden of repaying the loan lies with their heirs, and debt aversion predicts low interest. Third, homeowners who are more concerned about their standard of living in retirement are more likely to be interested in the product. We find, however, no conclusive evidence supporting our a priori notion that greater financial literacy is a predictor of higher interest in RMs.
Introduction
As Western societies are experiencing unprecedented population ageing, the availability of financial instruments designed to meet the needs of the elderly has become crucial. Among such instruments, reverse mortgages (RMs) stand out, since they allow better consumption smoothing in old age. At the same time, by encouraging the direct participation of the elderly in financing their retirement needs, RMs could ease the burden of ageing on public budgets.
According to Modigliani and Bruemberg's (1954) lifecycle hypothesis, individuals smooth their lifetime consumption by borrowing when 'young', saving when 'middle aged', and dissaving when 'old'. Empirically, however, the rate of wealth decumulation appears slower than the model predicts (Venti and Wise 1987; Ando et al.1993; Chiuri and Jappelli 2007; Angelini and Laferrère 2010) , with precautionary savings motivated by expected health and care expenditures (Carroll et al. 1992 ) and bequest motives explaining discrepancies between facts and theory.
The portfolio composition of the elderly, which generally favours illiquid assets such as housing (Mitchell and Piggott 2003) , can be a further disincentive to asset depletion. Housing equity can be liquidated by selling one's home and renting, or moving to a smaller dwelling (downsizing), however, since liquidating housing assets involves psychological as well as financial transaction costs (Leviton 2002) , the elderly may prefer to settle for lower consumption levels. RMs are innovative in that they allow elderly homeowners to consume (part of) their housing equity without having to disrupt housing arrangements and without any obligation of repayment until the borrower dies, moves out, or sells the house (Eschtruth and Tran 2001). They differ from home reversion programs (such as the sale of bare ownership) in that the property rights over the house remain with the borrower.
Despite their welfare-improving potential, RMs have met with only very limited acceptance (Caplin 2001) .
Because of its swift population ageing and high homeownership rates (78% among the elderly), Italy is an interesting case for studying households' attitudes toward RMs. Drawing on a unique dataset, the 2007 UniCredit Survey (UCS), in which over 1,200 respondents indicated their interest in taking out such a loan (with 40% expressing various degrees of appeal), we investigate the underlying factors determining interest in the product with the use of a discrete choice model, ordered probit. We find that risk/uncertainty-related elements are significantly correlated with interest in the product, while the bequest motive does not appear statistically significant. Homeowners who are less attached to their home and convey no qualms in liquidating it are also more likely to be interested in RMs. Negative expectations about one's standard of living after retirement is a significant predictor of interest.
Conversely, we find no evidence supporting our a priori assumption that greater financial literacy is correlated with higher interest in RMs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the main features of RMs. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 calculates the net worth of RMs and provides clues on their potential market size. Section 4 introduces the data sources and explains how the main indicators are constructed. Section 5 describes the econometric model and presents the estimated results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
RMs: An overview
RMs allow elderly homeowners (or couples) to borrow against their housing equity: the borrower can choose between the loan being paid out as a lump sum, through fixed monthly payments (tenure plan or life annuity), or as a line of credit the borrower can access any time. The amount of the loan depends positively on the age of the borrower and the value of the property and negatively on the interest rate. The outstanding balance of the loan grows over time, as the interest is capitalised, but no payment is due until the individual (or spouse) dies, moves out, or sells the house.
When either of these events occurs, the loan must be repaid in full -in one solution within the subsequent 10 to 12 months -and with any available source of funds, including proceeds from the sale of the house. Contrary to widespread belief, the lender does not receive the house as repayment (Eschtruth and Tran 2001) . The European Union (EU) RM market is not only very thin, but also unevenly developed across countries with regards to volume of production, lending methods, and diversity of products.
1 Most equity release schemes in the EU share common criteria, such as minimum age requirements and minimum property value (which must be free from other debt), and involve a series of protections for borrowers, as well as the obligation to carry out repairs and maintenance. Borrowers are protected from declining home prices, since the value of the loan cannot exceed the value of the house (no negative equity guarantee). Conversely, if the house is sold for more than the loan is worth, the excess equity belongs to the heirs. 
Estimating the monetary value of RMs
Our analysis cannot directly estimate the impact of RM fees on (potential) RM demand, since we do not have the relevant data; we can, however, appraise the monetary value of RMs, even if rather crudely, as a percentage increase in income for a given demographic and housing equity level, and see whether it has a substantial (positive) effect on the probability of being interested.
We adopt the sinking fund formula used in Ong (2008) (2006) define financial literacy as a set of tools enabling one to better allocate financial resources; it is often associated with numerical skills, such as the ability to calculate rates of return on investments and the interest rate on debt, or understanding economic concepts such as the trade-off between risk and return, the benefits of diversification, and the benefits and risks associated with specific financial decisions. 10 Federal housing association.
Demonstration by Rodda et al. (2000) and shows the monthly payments generated by an RM for a given housing equity level, interest rate, and life expectancy.
Payments to borrowers are calculated according to the principal limit factor, 11 the age (or life expectancy) of the (youngest, in a couple) borrower, the mortgage interest rate, and the adjusted property value. As for our calculations (reported in Table 1 ), the principal limit factor in Italy ranges from roughly 20% of the housing equity for 65-years-olds to roughly 50% for those over 90 12 ; the borrower's life expectancy (in months) is set at 100 minus the current age, multiplied by 12 (Rodda et al. 2000) ; the interest rate is set at 6.8% per annum (0.57% per month), an average of the Deutsche Bank (7.3%), 13 Monte dei Paschi di Siena (7.9%), and the Housing and Urban Development's HECM (5.5%) RM rates; the average housing equity is calculated from our sample homeowners.
The monthly payment to the borrower under the tenure plan can be computed as an annuity, using the formula C includes all initial costs and fees (which, for simplicity, we set equal to zero) r = monthly interest rate (approximated) e i = life expectancy (in months), calculated as 100 minus current age Table 1 describes the results of our calculations for the UCS sample. The first column reports estimates of the average housing equity by housing quintile, age, household income units, and geographical area. The second column shows the 11 The principal limit is computed so that the expected mortgage insurance losses over the life of the loan are no greater than the expected premium collected. The higher the expected interest rates, the lower the principal limit factor: Higher expected interest rates mean higher future loan balances, which would result in larger insurance losses unless the amount of principal advanced were reduced. 12 The values reported are for single male householders; the corresponding percentages for single females are 15.3% for 65-year-olds to 46% for those over 90. The maximum loan amount for couples is lower (14-45%). 13 
Empirical analysis

Data
Our analysis draws from a unique source of data, the UCS, carried out in 2007. The survey targets the bank's clients aged 21-75 with at least €10,000 in deposits. The sample is stratified according to geographical area, city size, and financial wealth. 'barely interested', and 59.4 'not interested' (see Figure 1 ).
The UCS oversamples the wealthy (see Table 3 Over 85% of respondents consider not having future debts an important reason for saving, and over 70.5% are averse to debt. When asked how they would finance a hypothetical expenditure of €20,000, more than 60% replied they would draw from their savings, 20% would sell their financial assets, and about 16% would take out a bank loan. One question was specifically asked to assess respondents' willingness to sell their home as a means of increasing future income: the idea that the elderly do not wish to downsize appears to be confirmed by the high proportion answering 'certainly not' (53.1%) or 'probably not' (27.0%).
The respondents' financial literacy was gauged by four questions about inflation, interest rates, and portfolio diversification, plus a self-assessment of how well they understood specific financial instruments. Less than 13% of the respondents answered at least three questions correctly, with elderly female householders exhibiting overall worse performance (see Figure 2 and the questions in the Appendix).
Econometric specifications
Only homeowners who answered the RM-related question are included in the regression, which in some cases can reduce the scope for our estimates. 19 However, approximately 45% are at least 60 years old and, since we are assessing potential demand given the expression of interest and not the actual uptake of RMs, the response given by younger householders is equally valid. The reason we are using the UCS rather than the more representative SHIW is that, to our knowledge, it is the only survey in Italy that includes a specific question on RMs. Bearing in mind such limitations, we can further our analysis and investigate the determinant of interest in 
where x is a vector of covariates, N is the number of respondents, and ε is the error term, which we assume to be normally distributed.
Let µ1< µ2 < µ3 < µ4 < µ5 be the unknown thresholds parameters or cutoff points.
Then we observe
The threshold parameters are estimated together with the β values to help match the probabilities associated with each discrete outcome.
The probabilities of y i being classified as not interested, barely interested, somewhat interested, quite interested, and very interested, respectively, are given by
Both the cutoff points and β coefficients can be estimated as an ordered probit model by the maximum likelihood method (Greene 2003; Train 2003) . Estimating the β values is not enough, since they do not reflect marginal changes in probability; therefore we calculate the marginal effects (at the mean value) to interpret results more clearly.
The vector of covariates x includes the following: householder age, age squared, age cubed, the log of the household income, the log of housing wealth, the ratio of the RM annuity to income, a financial literacy index, a risk aversion index, and several dichotomous variables to control for heterogeneity (single/divorced, widower, female, retired, resident in the north/south, saving to leave a bequest, higher education, children, negative retirement expectations, debt aversion, and willingness to sell the house).
Estimation results
A rich set of sociodemographic factors, personal characteristics, and preferences has been used to capture respondents' attitudes in the ordered probit regression. A firstorder probit was carried out using only demographic and socioeconomic variables as controls (not reported). Age, gender, and higher or middle education are not significant, while having no education at all is negatively correlated with interest in RMs. Being single or divorced is significantly correlated with a higher level of interest. Household income is not significant, while the log of housing equity displays a significant negative correlation with interest in RMs. The variable representing the percentage increase in household income yielded by an RM annuity has a large positive coefficient but is not statistically significant. 20 Residence in the northern part of the country is also positively correlated. The bequest motive does not emerge from our regression, since neither the binary variable representing households with children nor that indicating bequest as an important reason for saving (not reported) is statistically significant.
When adding more controls to the ordered probit, we see that personal attitudes are more significantly correlated with a given level of interest in the product (see Table 5 ); in particular, higher risk aversion and negative expectations about the future predict higher interest.
The effect of risk aversion is estimated by means of the set of questions found in the Appendix, through an index taking on values from 0.1 to 1 (low to high risk aversion). 21 A higher level of risk aversion is positively correlated to interest in RMs, lowering the probability that y=1 (respondent is not interested) by 10.9%. The perception of risks specifically related to housing investment is captured by a binary variable awarding one point to homeowners who perceive housing investment as quite risky or very risky, and zero otherwise. As the binary variable for housing perceived as a risky investment takes the value of one, the probability that y=1 decreases by 15.2%. Uncertainty about future economic well-being is gauged by a binary variable awarding the score of one to respondents who claimed to be very worried or quite worried about their economic welfare in old age after retirement, and zero otherwise. Since the binary variable takes the value of one, the probability that y=1 decreases by 9.1% (at the 1% significance level).
We find evidence contrasting the suggestion that the desire to move from one's current home is a deterrent to entering the RM market (Kutty 1999; Caplin 2001): on the contrary, the strongest predictor of interest in RM is willingness to sell one's house, indicated by a binary variable equal to one if the respondent claimed to be 'certainly' or 'quite probably' willing to liquidate his or her house (as a means of increasing income), or equal to zero if the respondent was 'certainly not' or 'probably not' interested in liquidating his or her home. Since the binary variable takes the value of one, it raises the probability that y=5 ('very interested' in RMs) by 2.1%, and that of y=1 by 27.4%.
Among the predictors of lower interest, reluctance to borrow (debt aversion) is particularly significant. Debt aversion, captured by a binary variable taking on the value of one for respondents who claim not to want to take on any debt, and zero otherwise, raises the probability that y=1 by 14.9% (at the 1% significance level). As financial literacy increases, so does the probability of not being interested in the product; however, the results are not very robust, and the correlation becomes insignificant after a few robustness checks are performed. The effect of selected significant regressors is summarised in Figure 3 .
Further checks are carried out, splitting the sample into those who are willing and unwilling to sell their house (not reported, but available on request). Among respondents who are more attached to their homes -and therefore not willing to sell, being a pensioner and having negative post-retirement expectations are significant predictors of interest in the product. Note that the sample size is extremely reduced, since the percentage of householders willing to sell their house is not very high.
Conclusions
Understanding the prospective role of RMs is important for both micro and macroeconomic reasons: it can increase income security in old age and allow better consumption smoothing, as well as alleviate the burden of an ageing population on public budgets. This paper contributes to the task by focusing on the Italian potential market.
Since approximately 70% of the Italian population are homeowners, with housing wealth representing over 80% 22 of its assets, the availability of home equity release instruments is an important determinant of the timing and dimension of wealth depletion with old age. We estimate householder characteristics most significantly correlated with a given level of interest: demographics, except for being a resident in the north of Italy, do not have a significant effect. Household income is not significant. Housing equity is negatively correlated with interest in the product. Debt aversion lowers the probability of being interested in the product, while being more risk averse and having negative expectations about post-retirement welfare are predictors of higher interest.
Three main findings emerge from our analysis: first, homeowners who are prepared to sell their home are more likely to be interested in the product, considered as an alternative to downsizing. Second, respondents perceive RMs as debt (even though the burden of repaying the loan lies with their heirs), and debt aversion predicts low interest. Third, homeowners who are more concerned about their wellbeing after retirement are also more likely to be interested in RMs, which is consistent with both the cuts and greater uncertainty that Italian households had have to endure subsequent to recent pension reforms. Our results seem to downplay bequests, since the relation between having children and interest in RMs is not statistically significant. We find no conclusive evidence to support our a priori that high financial literacy is a strong predictor of interest in RMs.
Appendix. Survey questions used to construct the control variables
Risk aversion
Gain -Imagine you are in a room from which you can exit through two doors: If you choose the correct one, you win €10,000; if you choose the wrong one, you win nothing. Of course, you don't know where the prize is. You can also choose a back door and withdraw a fixed amount. Answer: Yes/no. − If I offered €100, would you give up choosing between the two doors and settle for the back door? (Continue to the next question if no.) And if I offered €500? And if I offered €1,500? […] And if I offered €9,000? Loss -Imagine now a more difficult situation. You can still exit the room through two doors, however if you choose the correct one, you win nothing, but if you choose the wrong one, you lose €10,000. You may also choose a third door and lose a fixed amount. − Would you pay €9,000 to exit through the backdoor? (Continue to the next if she says No)
Debt aversion
What is your opinion about borrowing? (select one answer) I have no qualms/impediments to using loans should I need to (10.5%); I am willing to resort only to limited borrowing, since I would rather not encumber my future with excessive burdens (18.9%); I would rather not have debts (70.6%).
Financial literacy:
The respondent is awarded one point for answering correctly.
Inflation.
Suppose a bank account yields a 2% interest per annum (after expenses and taxes). If actual inflation is 2% per year (assuming you did not access your account) after two years, the amount deposited can buy you (select one answer): More than it can buy today; less than it can buy today; the same as it can buy today (correct); and cannot answer/cannot understand.
Interest rates
Imagine having a 'tip' and knowing for certain that in six months interest rates will rise. Do you think it is appropriate to purchase fixed rate bonds today? Yes; no (correct); I do not know.
Diversification 1
In relation to investments, people often talk about diversification. In your opinion, to have proper diversification of one's investments means (select one response): To have in one's investment portfolio bonds and shares; to not invest for too long in the same financial product; to invest in the greatest possible number of financial products; to invest simultaneously in multiple financial products to limit exposure to the risks associated with individual products (correct); to not invest in high-risk instruments; I do not know/cannot understand.
Diversification 2
Look at this card. In your opinion, which one of these portfolios is better diversified? (select one answer) 70% Special Treasury Bonds (BPT), 15% euro area equity fund, 15% in two to three activities of Italian companies; 70% BPT, 30% euro area equity fund (correct); 70% BPT, 30% in two to three activities of Italian companies; 70% BPT), 30% in shares of a company that I know well; I do not know/cannot read.
Post-retirement expectations -select one answer How worried are you about your economic well-being in old age/after you retire? Not worried; barely worried; quite worried; very worried. 
